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Abstract:  
 
The concept of the reservation wage has played an important role in labour market theory; 
particularly in models of job search, labour supply and labour market participation. Despite this 
core theoretical role, there is a scarcity of empirical research which explores the setting of 
reservation wages at the individual level. In this paper, we focus on the determinants of 
reservation wages, with a particular focus on health, which has attracted very little attention 
despite its importance from a policy perspective. We use data for males from 14 waves of the 
British Household Panel Survey and estimate an endogenous switching model which predicts 
reservation wages for the unemployed and market wages for the employed. We employ methods 
to deal with the endogeneity of health, measurement errors in our self reported health variable 
and selection into economic activity. Our results suggest that health is an important determinant 
of selection, both into economic activity and into employment (versus unemployment) but that, 
once these participation effects are accounted for, health is not a significant determinant of either 
the reservation wage or the market wage. This casts doubt on the results of a number of previous 
studies that have failed to appropriately account for selection in models of male wages. Our 
results have important policy implications since they suggest that poor health is a major cause of 
economic inactivity.  
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1. Introduction  
The relationship between health and labour market outcomes, such as participation and wages, is 
the subject of a growing literature fed by the increasing availability of longitudinal data sets that 
contain rich information on individual health as well as labour market status and a host of other 
socio-demographic variables. Attempting to estimate the causal effect of health on labour 
market outcomes is complex because health and work are jointly determined (Adams et al. 
2003). In addition, issues such as selection into economic activity and justification bias in self-
reported health, require multiple econometric solutions in order to obtain meaningful estimates 
of the true causal effects of health status. It is therefore very encouraging to see the normally 
disparate literatures of health economics and labour economics come together to tackle an issue 
which is of key policy relevance. While considerable progress in understanding the relationship 
between health and the labour market has been made via both theoretical and empirical work 
(for example Adams et al. 2003; Stern, 1989), our study is motivated by an important gap in the 
existing literature. The two disciplines of health and labour economics do not yet seem to have 
met around the concept of the reservation wage.   
 
The reservation wage is the lowest wage at which an individual is willing to work, and this 
concept has played an important role in labour market theory. In particular, the reservation wage 
is central to theoretical models of job search, labour supply and labour market participation (see, 
for example, Mortensen, 1986). Despite the key role played by the reservation wage in labour 
market theory, there is a scarcity of empirical research which explores the setting of reservation 
wages at the individual level, and this may be due to a scarcity of data relating to reservation 
wages. Much of the sparse existing literature tends to focus on how reservation wages affect the 
duration of unemployment, see, for example, Lancaster and Chesher (1983), Addison et al. 
(2004) and Blackaby et al. (2007). There are however theoretical reasons for expecting 
reservation wages to be influenced by the individual’s state of health. Individuals in poor health 
are expected to have a higher reservation wage reflecting their greater disutility of work. This 
has direct policy consequences in relation to the increasing numbers of individuals in Europe 
who are classified as economically inactive due to health problems.  
 
In this paper, we consider the determinants of reservation wages, with a particular focus on 
health, which has attracted very little attention in the existing empirical literature despite its 
importance from a policy perspective. We exploit the fact that in the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS) we have information on the stated reservation wages of the unemployed as well 
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as the market wages of employed individuals. We use an endogenous switching model to 
simultaneously estimate the probability of being employed versus unemployed alongside the 
continuous wage outcomes for each group. Of particular importance is the fact that we also 
allow for selection into labour market activity, where those who are unemployed but want to 
work are classified as economically active, whereas those who have very weak labour force 
attachment are viewed as inactive. We argue that this is a more appropriate classification for a 
study of health and labour market outcomes than that which is normally adopted in the literature, 
and results in findings that are in contrast to previous work. Our econometric analysis also 
attempts to deal with the endogeneity of health and with measurement errors in the self reported 
health information. 
 
In contrast to much of the empirical literature, we find no effect of health on the market wages 
of the employed, and we find no evidence for the argument that has appeared in some papers 
(for example Walker and Thompson, 1996; Gordon and Blinder, 1980) that those with health 
problems will have higher reservation wages. Instead our results suggest that the main role of 
poor health is to weaken labour force attachment for those in the labour market (be it currently 
employed or unemployed), while excellent self-assessed health has a positive effect on the 
probability of employment (versus unemployment), the health effects on the wages of both 
groups are insignificant.  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the previous work in this area; 
Section 3 explains our endogenous switching method, our models for health and treatment of 
selection into labour market activity; Section 4 describes the data and variables; Section 5 
presents the results and Section 6 explains their relevance and concludes.  
2. Previous Literature 
 
Analysis of the relationship between health and labour market outcomes is theoretically 
grounded in the concept of human capital investment. While much of the early human capital 
literature focused on the returns to education (see Mincer 1958), increasingly health has also 
been recognised as a component of human capital1, and a major theoretical contribution was 
made by Grossman’s (1972) model of the demand for health capital. Early empirical studies 
identify important effects of health on labour market participation and wages (Grossman and 
Benham, 1973; Luft, 1975; Bartel and Taubman 1979; Berkowitz et al., 1983). However, these 
 
1 Becker (1962) and Mushkin (1962) are two of the earliest studies.  
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studies were usually limited by cross-sectional data, which made it hard to disentangle the 
complex interrelationships (see Section 3.1). More recently, the increased availability of panel 
data sets with rich information on health and socio-economic indicators means that the literature 
on health status and labour market outcomes, such as participation and earnings, has gained 
momentum.  
 
One strand of the literature has focused on the implications of disability rather than health for 
labour market outcomes. In the US, Haveman et al. (1994) use eight waves of the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) to consider the effect of work limiting disability on working time and 
wages. They find that disability has a significantly negative effect on both outcomes and that 
this effect is larger once they have accounted for the endogeneity of health. For the UK, Walker 
and Thompson (1996) use the first 3 waves of the BHPS and find that, after controlling for the 
endogeneity of schooling, disability has a greater effect on labour market participation than on 
wages. In a similar vein, Kidd et al. (2000) compare the labour market outcomes of disabled and 
able-bodied men in the UK and find substantial wage and participation rate differences between 
the two groups with the disabled characterised by lower wages and lower participation rates with 
productivity related characteristics explaining approximately 50% of the differentials. In a more 
recent study, Jones (2006) states that whilst the average wages of the disabled are over 85% of 
their non disabled counterparts, the disabled participation rate is approximately half that of the 
non disabled. 
 
 Contoyannis and Rice (2001) use the first six waves of the BHPS to explore the effect of self-
assessed general and psychological health rather than disability on wages in the UK and find that 
reduced psychological health reduces hourly wages for men and that excellent self-assessed 
health increases hourly wages for women. A number of reasons have been put forward to 
explain why health may influence wages, see Contoyannis and Rice (2001). For example, 
increased health may increase productivity and wages may rise accordingly. Employers may 
believe that health is correlated with unobserved characteristics which are positively associated 
with productivity or employers may simply discriminate against individuals perceived to be in 
poor health.  
 
In sum, the existing literature suggests that poor health is associated with lower participation 
rates and, if employed, lower wages. As argued by Cai and Kalb (2006), if poor health leads to 
lower potential earnings, regardless of whether this is due to low productivity or employer 
discrimination, the opportunity cost of leisure falls, which impinges upon willingness to 
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participate in the labour market. In addition, high reservation wages may reflect benefit income 
associated with the disability thereby increasing the replacement ratio. Alternatively, individuals 
in poor health may value leisure time (i.e. time to look after one’s health) more highly or the 
disutility associated with work may be high due to additional time or effort associated with 
working, which may lead to an increase in the individual’s reservation wage. Hence, as argued 
by Jones (2006), low participation rates may partly reflect high reservation wages associated 
with poor health and/or certain types of disability.  
 
Despite, hints in the literature about the potential role of reservation wages, to our knowledge 
there is only one existing empirical study that considers the role of health in determining 
reservation wages. Gordon and Blinder (1980) use US data from the early 1970s to study the 
retirement decisions of white men aged 58 to 67. They hypothesise that an individual retires 
when his reservation wage exceeds his market wage, acknowledging that failing health in old 
age may make work more difficult and/or less remunerative. Their results suggest that health 
impacts significantly positively on the reservation wage and negatively on the market wage. 
However, the health information used is very limited and is assumed to be exogenous, which the 
authors acknowledge probably results in a large upward bias in their estimates of the effect of 
health on wages.  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Health and Labour Market outcomes  
There are three sources of potential endogeneity that exist when attempting to estimate the 
causal effect of health status on labour market outcomes. Firstly, there is true simultaneity 
between health and labour market outcomes, since while health may affect productivity and in 
turn wages, it is also the case that labour market status may have a direct effect on health. 
Secondly, it is likely that unobserved effects on both health and labour market outcomes are 
correlated; for example, those individuals who have a psychological disposition towards high 
levels of motivation may have higher labour market rewards and maintain better psychological 
health. Thirdly, as (in common with much of the empirical literature) we are using self-reported 
health measures, these are subject to reporting bias and measurement error. Labour market status 
might have a direct affect on own health perception (as distinct from actual health status). 
People may have incentives (financial and social) to report poor health in order to justify their 
labour market status (Kerkhofs and Lindeboom, 1995; Kreider, 1999). Also self –assessed health 
(SAH) measures are based on subjective judgements which may not be comparable across 
individuals (Lindeboom and van Doorslaer 2004). While measurement error will lead to 
downward bias in our estimate of the effects of health on labour market outcomes, the other 
effects will lead to upward bias (Bound 1991). The common assumption in the literature seems 
to be that the latter outweighs the former but Bound et al. (1995) point out that the empirical 
evidence is mixed.  
 
Our econometric approach to the problems of endogeneity and measurement error is to extend a 
method first used by Stern (1989) and Bound (1991). This uses specific measures of health 
(health problems) as instruments for the ordinal SAH measure. The idea is that more objective 
measures are used to instrument the endogenous and potentially error ridden subjective health 
measure2. We follow Bound et al. (1995) and Disney et al. (2006) in including socio-economic 
characteristics (alongside health problems) as predictors of SAH3. We then extend this approach 
by using generalised ordered probit (GOP) estimation to allow for the fact that individuals with 
the same underlying level of health may apply different thresholds when reporting SAH on an 
ordinal scale (Rice et al. 2007, Lindeboom and van Doorslaer 2004). This reporting bias may be 
due to ‘index shift’, whereby the shape of the SAH distribution stays the same but its location 
shifts reflecting a parallel shift in all reporting thresholds for sub-groups of the population; or 
‘cut-point shift’, which implies a change in the relative positions of the reporting thresholds for 
particular sub-groups. The GOP model is appropriate here since it relaxes the assumption of 
constancy of threshold parameters that is a restriction of the standard ordered probit model.  
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*
0
1
2
3
i
poor / very poor health
fair health
H
good / very good health
excellent health
α θ
⎧⎪⎪= ⎨⎪⎪⎩
ν= + +
j
      (1) 
Equation (1) is estimated across individuals i and over time, where  is the unobserved health 
state of the individual and H
*H
i is its observed counterpart, where iH =  if *1ij i ijHµ µ− < ≤  with 
µ ’s being thresholds. We estimate equation (1) via GOP analysis allowing for clustering to 
account for the panel aspect of our data. K is a vector of variables assumed to determine SAH 
(and reporting of SAH), such as specific health problems and socioeconomic characteristics such 
                                                 
2 Bound et al. (1995) suggest a number of reasons why it may not be appropriate to use information on health 
problems directly in a labour market participation model, not least because these may not be highly correlated with 
ability to work.   
3 Campolieti (2002) takes a similar approach. This is distinct from Rice et al. (2007) who distinguish between 
health problems which are allowed to determine self-assessed health, and socio-economic variables which are 
assumed only to influence reporting bias.  
as age, educational attainment and income4. We then define health stock dummy variables as 
predicted from equation (1):  
1
1
;
0i
fair health
HS
other
⎧= ⎨⎩
   2 3
1 / 1
;
0 0i i
good very good health excellent health
HS HS
other other
⎧ ⎧= =⎨ ⎨⎩ ⎩
where poor/very poor health is the omitted category. In order to explore the robustness of our 
empirical results, as well as dealing with health stock in this way, we also estimate models 
where health is treated as an exogenous variable.  
3.2 Labour Force Participation 
Having generated the health stock dummy variables we initially consider their effect upon 
labour market attachment (or participation); that is whether or not the individual is: (a) attached 
to the labour market, either being employed, self employed or currently unemployed but actively 
seeking work; or (b) not attached to the labour market, being for example long-term sick and 
disabled, retired (before the statutory retirement age of 65) or engaged in family care. Note that 
participation here includes unemployment. More details on the definition of non-participation, 
within the context of our data, are given in Section 4.  
3*
11
1 0 . .
0 . .
i i i j ijt ij
i
PART if PART M HS i e in labour market
PART otherwise i e not in labour market
γ π ς−== = + + >
=
∑ ,  (2) 
In equation (2)  is a latent variable which determines the outcome regime and  
indicates the individual’s observed labour market state. This is modelled across individuals and 
over time via a probit specification allowing for clustering conditional upon the (lagged) health 
stock dummy variables, modelled via equation (1), and a set of controls included in the vector M 
consisting of the number of hours per week that the individual cares for others (including those 
within and outside of the household), whether their partner is primarily responsible for child 
care, the number of children aged five and under, and the number of children aged between six 
and sixteen, which act as over-identifying instruments. The health dummy variables are lagged 
by one period to preclude the possibility of feedback from current labour market participation 
status to past health status, thus avoiding one potential cause of endogeneity. From equation (2) 
we calculate an inverse Mills ratio defined by:  
*
iPART iPART
{ }( ) { }( )3 31 11 1/ /i j ijt i j ijtj jM HS M HSζ ζφ γ π σ γ π− −= =+ Φ +∑ ∑ σ
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4 The underlying assumption in equation (1) is that the specific health problems predict SAH while the other 
socioeconomic characteristics model the reporting cut-points.  
where ( ).φ  and  represent the standard normal density and cumulative distribution 
functions respectively. The inverse Mills ratio derived from estimation of (2) is used to control 
for sample selection bias into labour market participation when we analyse wage outcomes in 
equations (3) and (4) below.  
( ).Φ
3.3 The Determinants of Reservation and Market Wages 
Our main focus in terms of labour market outcomes is to consider the determinants of both 
reservation wages and market wages, with a particular emphasis on health status. We adopt a 
full information maximum likelihood (FIML) approach to estimate an endogenous switching 
regression model (see Maddala, 1983; and Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004). The basic idea behind the 
switching model is that the outcome equation (reservation wages versus market wages) depends 
on a regime switch, in our case unemployment versus employment. Endogenous switching 
models have been used in a variety of contexts within labour economics. For example, Ransom 
(1987) adopts this approach to model household labour supply decisions whereby the 
simultaneity of the participation decision of the wife and the labour supply decision of the 
husband are accounted for. Heitmueller (2004) models the public-private sector wage gap in 
Scotland via an endogenous switching approach. Finally, Garcia Perez and Rebollo Sanz (2005) 
adopt a switching approach to explore the relationship between job mobility and wage mobility.  
 
To our knowledge, the endogenous switching approach has not been applied to the analysis of 
reservation wages. It seems, however, particularly appropriate for the analysis of reservation 
wages at the individual level since the switching model sorts individuals into two groups: the 
unemployed and the employed. For the unemployed, we observe their reservation wages, whilst 
for the employed we observe their actual wages. It is apparent that the sample of unemployed 
(and employed) individuals is potentially non-randomly selected; for example, the high ability 
individuals are more likely to be in employment. However, selection issues have received very 
little attention in the empirical reservation wage literature. Some studies, such as Hogan (2004), 
have included an inverse Mills ratio term, i.e. they have taken a two stage approach to control 
for selection into unemployment, whilst other studies have not corrected for sample selection 
bias (for example Prasad, 2003).  
 
The endogenous switching approach allows us to simultaneously estimate a binary indicator that 
determines the outcome regime (unemployment or employment) and the continuous outcome 
variables in the model: reservation wages for the unemployed and actual wages for the 
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employed. This approach yields consistent standard errors and relies on joint normality of the 
error terms in the binary and continuous equation (Maddala, 1983; and Lokshin and Sajaia, 
2004). Simultaneous estimation is particularly important for our application since it is apparent 
that reservation wages reflect employment status and observed employment status reflects 
reservation wages. For example, an individual with an unrealistically high reservation wage 
given his/her skills is unlikely to find a suitable job. Thus, the simultaneous modelling approach 
corrects for the selection bias in the estimates of the reservation wage equation.  
 
At time t equations (3) and (4) are estimated simultaneously across individuals, i, following 
Maddala (1983), Lokshin and Sajaia, (2004): 
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3*
11
1 0 .
0 .
i i i j ijt ij
i
d if d Z HS u i e unemployment
d otherwise i e employment
γ π −== = + + >
=
∑
3
1 1 1 1 11
3
2 2 2 1 21
ln 1
ln 0
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w X HS if d
w X HS if d
β λ ε
β φ ε
−=
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= + + =
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∑
∑       (4) 
where:  is a latent variable which determines the outcome regime; the variable  indicates 
the observed state for an individual (i.e. unemployment or employment);  denotes the 
continuous outcome (dependent) variables for states 
*
id id
ln liw
1, 2l = , i.e. log reservation wages or log 
actual wages, where regime 1 denotes unemployment and regime 2 denotes employment. A 
vector of variables that determine regime switching is denoted by iZ ; liX  are vectors of 
exogenous variables that determine wages; and γ ,  and  are the parameter vectors. The 
error terms , 
1β 2β
iu 1iε  and 2iε  are assumed to have a trivariate normal distribution with mean vector 
zero and covariance matrix:  
2
2
21 1
2
31 2
uσ
σ σ
σ σ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥Ω = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
L
M
L
.  
2
uσ  is the variance of the error term from the selection equation, i.e. , and id 2lσ  reflects the 
variance from the reservation wage and wage equations. The covariance between  and iu 1iε  is 
given by 21σ , similarly the covariance between  and iu 2iε  is given by 31σ . Two coefficients of 
correlation can then be defined as: ( )21 21 1/ uρ σ σ σ⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  and ( )22 31 2/ uρ σ σ σ⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦ . If 1ρ ( 2ρ ) is 
significantly different from zero then the estimated model implies that unemployed (employed) 
individuals have a lower reservation wage (wage from employment) than a random individual 
from the sample would have. Given that the BHPS provides information relating to our sample 
of individuals over time, we account for the panel aspect of our data set by allowing for 
observations to be independent across groups but not necessarily within groups, i.e. repeated 
observations for individuals over time.  
3.4 Model Structure  
To ease exposition, Figure 1 presents the structure of the participation, endogenous switching 
and wage equations described above. The participation equation (2) is shown on the left of the 
diagram. The switching equation (3) and wage equations (4), on the right of the diagram, are 
only estimated for those people who participate ( 1iPART = ). Selection into participation is 
accounted for by including the inverse Mills ratio estimated from equation (2) as an additional 
covariate in the switching and wage equations. For those individuals who participate and are 
employed (di = 0), we estimate a market wage equation; whereas for those who participate but 
are unemployed (di = 1), we estimate a reservation wage equation. The switching and wage 
equations are estimated simultaneously by FIML.  
 
This treatment of participation (or attachment) and selection is different to the approach that is 
normally taken in the literature. Most studies, either exclude from the analysis those individuals 
for whom  (i.e. the bottom arm on the left in Figure 1 is ignored), or they 
inappropriately include them along with the unemployed (i.e. the bottom arm of the left and 
right hand sides are amalgamated); these studies then only take selection into employment 
(versus unemployment) into account (i.e. selection is only considered in relation to the right-
hand side of Figure 1). This seems particularly inappropriate when investigating the relationship 
between health and labour market outcomes because health is potentially an important reason for 
non-participation, thus exclusion of those people with the weakest labour force attachment is 
likely to result in biased results.  
0iPART =
 
Note that our conceptualisation of non-participation is different to unemployment; the 
unemployed in our model include only those who are actively seeking employment or state a 
positive desire to work5. Since we have reservation wage data for the unemployed we are able to 
estimate wage equations for both the employed and unemployed, and deal with selection into 
labour market participation (including unemployment) which should result in more appropriate 
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5 This definition is supported by the survey routing for the reservation wage question shown in Section 4.1.  
estimates of the effect of health on four different labour market outcomes: participation, the 
probability of gaining employment, wages and reservation wages.  
 
4. Data and Variables 
We use panel data available in the first 14 waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 
1991 to 2004. The BHPS is a longitudinal survey of private households in Great Britain, and was 
designed as an annual survey of each adult member of a nationally representative sample.  The 
first wave achieved a sample of some 5,500 households, covering approximately 10,300 adults 
from 250 areas of Great Britain. Additional samples of 1,500 households for both Scotland and 
Wales were added in 1999, and in 2001 a sample of 2,000 households in Northern Ireland were 
also added. The same individuals are re-interviewed in successive waves and, if they split off 
from their original households are also re-interviewed along with all adult members of their new 
households.  The BHPS includes rich information on labour market status, socio-demographic 
and health variables. 
 
We use an unbalanced sample of males of working age (18 to 65 years). Sample sizes are shown 
in the model structure diagram in Figure 1. Overall sample size is n = 48,227; of these 
 for n = 41,095 observations (where 1iPART = n i t= × ); and of these n = 37,224 are employed 
observations ( ) and n = 2,216 are unemployed observations (0id = 1id = ). For those n = 7,132 
observations for which ; 38% are long-term sick and disabled; 36% are retired 
(before the statutory retirement age of 65); 18% are in full-time education and the majority of 
the remainder are on paternity leave, engaged in family care, or on a government training 
scheme.  
0iPART =
 
The sections below describe the variables used in each equation and a full list of variables and 
definitions appears in Appendix 1. Summary statistics are reported in Table 1A (for variables in 
the participation and health stock equations) and Table 1B (for variables in the wage equations). 
4.1  Wages  
Equations (3) and (4) above show the specification of our endogenous switching model for 
outcome regime and wages. The defining feature of the BHPS for our study is that if the 
respondent ‘is not currently working but has looked for work in last week or last four weeks or 
has not looked for work in last week or last four weeks but would like a job’, he/she is asked to 
specify: ‘what is the lowest weekly take home pay you would consider accepting for a job?’. 
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This is the net reservation wage ( ) of equation (4). The net market wage ( ) is defined as 
‘usual net pay per month’ which measures usual monthly wage or salary payment after tax and 
other deductions in current main job for employees (self employees), which we then convert to a 
weekly amount. Thus if the respondent is working we observe the market wage ( ) and if the 
respondent is not working (but wants to work) we observe the reservation wage ( ). The wage 
variables are used in natural log form in the estimating equations deflated to 1991 prices
1w 2w
2w
1w
6.  
 
Histograms for the net reservation wage ( ) and net market wage ( ) are shown in 
Figure 2. The mean weekly net reservation wage is £162 and the mean weekly net market wage 
is £215. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the real mean net wages over time. Real mean market 
wages have increased by 7.7% from £208 in 1992 to £224 in 2004, whereas real mean 
reservation wages have increased by 49% from £140 to £208 in the same period. This 
convergence may be partly explained by the introduction of the national minimum wage in 1999 
and welfare reforms following the change in government. 
1ln w 2ln w
4.2 Health Status 
The health stock dummy variables (HSi) that appear in the participation equation (2), switching 
equation (3) and wage equations (4) are derived from GOP estimation of equation (1). Here the 
observed health state ( ) is self-assessed health (SAH) given in answer to the question: ‘please 
think back over the last 12 months about how your health has been. Compared to people of your 
own age, would you say that your health has on the whole been excellent/good/fair/poor/very 
poor?’
iH
7
 
The vector  of explanatory variables in the health stock equation (1) includes information on 
specific health problems. Individuals are asked whether or not they have any of the following 
health problems: arms, legs or hands; sight; hearing; skin conditions or allergies; 
iK
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6 Hofler and Murphy (1994) question the validity of this type of reservation wage data arguing that individuals may 
not be well-informed enough to provide meaningful answers. Interestingly, investigating the BHPS we find that the 
reservation wage data behaves as one would expect. Individuals who have a reservation wage greater than their 
wage predicted on the basis of human capital characteristics, or greater than the actual wage prevailing in their 
region for the occupation they are looking for work in, have a lower chance of finding future employment. In 
addition, Hogan (2004) shows that reservation wages of the unemployed in the BHPS adjust relatively quickly to 
macroeconomic shocks. This provides support for the validity of this data and we are confident that it has useful 
informational content on reservation wages. 
7 A continuity problem arises with this 5-point SAH variable because in wave 9 (only) there was a change in the 
question and available response categories. To achieve consistency over all 14 waves we follow the method of 
Hernandez-Quevedo et al., (2005) and recode SAH into the following 4-category scale: very poor or poor; fair; 
good or very good; excellent.    
chest/breathing; heart/blood pressure; stomach or digestion; diabetes; anxiety or depression; 
alcohol or drugs; epilepsy or migraine; or other. We create a binary dummy for the presence of 
each specific problem, and given the broad set of health problems included, it seems likely that 
we are measuring most of the important aspects of health. In order to cover all aspects of health, 
we also include a dummy variable reflecting whether or not health limits daily activity8.  
 
The vector  also includes a set of socioeconomic characteristics assumed to affect heath 
reporting behaviour. These are: age dummy variables, with the youngest age category (18 to 24) 
as the omitted category; marital status; household size; educational attainment;  labour market 
participation status (  as defined in Section 4.3 below); household labour income; whether 
or not the respondent is an immigrant or has a language problem that may have affected the 
BHPS interview.  
iK
iPART
 
In order to check the robustness of our empirical results we also estimate models where self-
assessed health is assumed to be exogenous. Here we code the SAH dummy variables directly 
from the answers to the SAH reported above. There are four health dummy variables: excellent, 
good/very good, fair, poor/very poor; the bottom category acts as the baseline.  
4.3 Participation Equation  
The dependent variable for the participation probit equation (2) denotes whether or not the 
individual is attached to the labour market. The classification is taken from the response to the 
question on current labour market status. For individuals who are classified as employed, self-
employed or unemployed, 1iPART = ; whereas for those individuals who are retired, on 
paternity  leave, caring for family, in full-time education, long-term sick or disabled, on a 
government training scheme or ‘other’, 0iPART = .  
 
As well as the health stock dummy variables ( ) defined above, the vector iHS iM  of explanatory 
variables in the participation equation also includes: age; marital status; race; educational 
attainment; caring responsibilities; number of school age and pre-school children; and household 
size.  
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8 This variable is not available in wave 9 of the BHPS. We impute missing values by setting wave 9 values to equal 
wave 8 values.  
4.4 Switching Equation  
The switching equation determines the outcome regime, and thus whether reservation wages or 
market wages are modelled in the wage equation. As in the case of participation (see Section 
4.3)  is defined from the question on current labour market status. For individuals who are 
unemployed  (and we observe reservation wages) for individuals who are employed or 
self-employed  (and we observe market wages).  
id
1id =
0id =
 
As well as the health stock dummy variables ( ) defined above, the vector ZiHS i of explanatory 
variables in the switching equation also includes: age; marital status; race; educational 
attainment; number of people employed in the household; number of children; household 
income from various sources (labour, asset and benefit); wage in previous employment; monthly 
housing/mortgage costs; labour market experience (years in unemployment in the reservation 
wage equation and years in employment in the market wage equation); the regional 
unemployment rate9; and, finally, the inverse Mills ratio from the participation equation (2) to 
control for selection into active labour market participation.  
4.5  Wage equations  
The dependent variables are described in Section 4.1. As well as the lagged health stock dummy 
variables ( ) defined above, the vector XiHS i of explanatory variables in the wage equations also 
includes: age; marital status; race; educational attainment; number of people employed in the 
household; number of children; household asset and benefit income; household labour income 
(excluding own wage in the market wage equation); wage in previous employment; monthly 
housing/mortgage costs; number of years of current labour market status; the regional 
unemployment rate; dummy variables for firm size, occupation and industry (of current main 
employment in the market wage equation and last/previous job in the reservation wage 
equation); and the inverse Mills ratio from the participation equation (2).  
 
All variables which appear in liX  are also included in iZ  and instruments used are obtained by 
non-linearities (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004), and whether the interviewer observed that the 
respondent had problems during the interview process, along with dummy variables for region 
and year.  
 
                                                 
 15
9 The regional unemployment rate data was obtained from the Office for National Statistics. 
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5. Results 
Table 2 presents the results of the GOP models (see equation (1)) for health stock10. In general 
these results are as expected. The presence of specific health problems and health limitation to 
daily activity increases the probability of reporting poor health. After conditioning on these 
health problems, age is associated with increased probability of reporting better health; 
education, labour market status and household income are also positively associated with health 
reporting; immigrants are more likely to report excellent health and people with language 
problems are less likely to do so.  
 
In Table 3 we consider how health and other covariates impact upon the probability of labour 
market participation i.e. either employed, self employed or unemployed but actively looking for 
work. In Panel A of Table 3 the full set of estimates are reported where the health stock has been 
generated, see Section 3.1, and Panel B shows results from treating health as an exogenous 
variable. Focusing upon Panel A it is clear that health has a positive and significant effect on the 
probability of participation in the labour market and the effects are large. Being in good/very 
good health (versus poor/very poor health) means the individual has a 61% greater chance of 
participating in the labour market. This compares to a 1.6% greater chance of participation if he 
has GCSEs (versus no qualifications) and around a 9% greater chance if he is aged 35-44 
(versus being aged 18-24). In addition to these effects, the individual is more likely to participate 
if he is married (or living as a couple), and/or white; and less likely to participate if he is in the 
oldest age category (aged 55-64), has caring responsibilities for an adult, and has children of 
school age. In comparison to the estimated health effects in Panel B, where health is exogenous, 
the effects are noticeably larger for endogenous health, suggesting the importance of 
measurement error and reporting heterogeneity, as discussed above. For example, being in 
good/very good health (versus poor/very poor health) means the individual has a 22% greater 
chance of participating in the labour market11. 
 
To provide a benchmark for the results of our endogenous switching model, we present OLS 
estimates for the wage equations in Table 4. The table is split into four panels where Panels A 
and B show the market wage and reservation wage equations respectively with no control for 
selection into participation; the final two panels (C and D) present results with selection, i.e. the 
inverse Mills ratio estimated from equation (2) is included as an additional covariate in both of 
 
10 For the health stock equations the sample size is n = 58,149 as no observations are lost due to lags (in contrast to 
the participation equation where health stock is lagged by one period in an effort to control for simultaneity).  
11 Region and year controls which are included in the participation equation are jointly significant. 
the wage equations. Panel A presents results with health stock dummy variables generated via 
the GOP models reported in Table 2; Panel B reports the coefficients on health dummy variables 
where health is assumed to be exogenous and the dummy variables are coded directly from the 
answers to the self-assessed health question reported in Section 4.2. When we do not control for 
sample selection, health appears to have an important positive effect on the market wage 
whether we measure health as the estimated latent health stock or use the self-assessed measure 
directly (i.e. assuming it is exogenous). The estimated effects are slightly larger for endogenous 
health, suggesting that measurement error and reporting heterogeneity bias outweighs the other 
potential sources of endogeneity bias in self-assessed health. For example being in excellent 
health (versus poor/very poor health) means that such an individual has a market wage around 
23% higher than a corresponding individual in the reference category. Once selection into 
participation is controlled for, via the inverse Mills ratio (see Panel C), the health effects upon 
market wages are reduced to around a 7% higher wage for an individual in excellent health in 
comparison to poor/very poor health. No effect is found from health upon the reservation wage 
regardless of how health is measured, i.e. via GOP or exogenously, or whether selection is 
controlled for.  
 
Having considered the standard OLS approach commonly used in the majority of the existing 
literature, we now explore how health affects wages allowing for endogenous switching. The 
results from the endogenous switching model (equations (3) and (4)) are shown in Tables 5 and 
6. Table 5 presents the results with no control for selection into participation (comparable to 
Table 4 Panels A and B under OLS), and Table 6 presents the results with sample selection 
controls included (comparable to Table 4 Panels C and D under OLS). As in Table 4, Panel A 
presents results with the latent health stock, whereas Panel B reports the marginal effects on the 
exogenous health dummy variables in both Tables 5 and 6.  
 
When selection into participation is not accounted for, see Table 5, health has a significant 
adverse effect on the probability of being unemployed ( 1id = ). For example, being in excellent 
health (relative to the omitted category) lowers the probability of being unemployed by 
approximately 1%. Once we control for selection into the labour market, see Table 6, only being 
in excellent health results in a lower probability of being unemployed (compared to the 
poor/very poor health baseline). The finding that health status affects labour market participation 
and employment status accords with much of the existing literature. 
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Turning to the wage equations (Tables 5 and 6), significant positive effects on market wages are 
found for being white and married (or living as a couple). Also positive effects are found for 
having more children, better education, higher housing costs, higher other household labour 
income, higher asset income and pay from last/previous employment. In addition, wages peak at 
age 35-44. The only significant negative effects on market wages are found from higher benefit 
income and the higher the number of employed people in the household. Analogous to market 
wages, reservation wages also peak at age 35-44; they also increase with education, housing 
costs, and previous wages. Factors which decrease the reservation wage include household 
labour income and the regional unemployment rate. Such findings are consistent with Prasad 
(2003) and Hogan (2004)12.  
 
We have already seen that health has an important influence on the probability of participating 
in the labour market (including being unemployed), and when we control for this selection in the 
switching and wage equations the health effects in these equations are much reduced, see Table 
6. Indeed, there are no health effects in the either of the wage equations and this finding is robust 
to defining health either exogenously or endogenously. This contrasts with the bulk of evidence 
from the existing literature and the most likely explanation is that we have controlled for the 
selecting out of a group who are usually excluded (or inappropriately classified) in analysis of 
health and labour market outcomes because they have very weak attachment to the labour 
market.  This is consistent with the findings in Tables 4 (OLS) and 5 (endogenous switching 
model) in that there is a positive health effect upon market wages for both endogenous and 
exogenous health in the absence of controlling for selection into the labour market. 
 
6. Conclusion 
As stated above, our results are in contrast with those found in most of the existing literature, 
and this is likely to be because we have controlled for the selecting out of a group who are 
usually excluded from analysis of health and labour market outcomes or inappropriately 
classified with the ‘unemployed’.  The unemployed in our model include only those who are 
actively seeking employment or state a positive desire to work. The non-participating group has 
a much weaker labour market attachment and, furthermore, health is the most important reason 
for their non-participation. Once this selection is controlled for, while excellent health still has a 
residual effect on the probability of employment (versus unemployment), as evident from the 
 18
                                                 
12 Note, although not reported both 1ρ  and 2ρ are both statistically significant at the 1 per cent level (see Section 
3.3). 
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switching equations, there are no remaining effects of health on the wages of the employed, or 
the reservation wages of the unemployed. The main effect of poor health appears to be keeping 
people away from the labour market, but for those in the labour market (be it currently employed 
or unemployed), health effects are insignificant once selection is addressed.  
 
Our results have implications for policies targeted at getting the economically inactive back into 
work. We point to a clear distinction between those who are currently unemployed, but desire to 
work, and those who are unattached to the labour market, and for this latter group poor health is 
the most likely explanation for inactivity. It may be that some of this group are able to work but 
getting them into employment will require coordinated health and labour market policy.   
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 Figure 1: Model Structure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equation (2)  Equations (3) and (4)  
Participation/attachment  Endogenous switching and 
wages  
Employed  
id = 0  ( market wage) 2w
Participating  (n = 37,224) 
iPART = 1  Unemployed  
id = 1   (n = 41,095) (  reservation 
wage) 
1w
(n = 2,216) 
Not participating  
iPART = 0  
(n = 7,132) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Log Reservation Wage (Unemployed) & Log Wage (Employed/Self Employed) – Males. 
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Figure 3: Real Market Wages and Reservation Wages by BHPS Wave - Males 
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Table 1A: Summary Statistics 
 HEALTH 
STOCK 
PARTICIPATION
 MEAN STD MEAN STD 
Health Status H (0=poor,…,3=excellent) 1.928 0.867 – – 
Labour Market Participation PART (0=not in labour market, 1=participant) 0.842 0.364 0.852 0.355 
Aged 25-34 (0=no, 1=yes) 0.239 0.426 0.237 0.426 
Aged 35-44 (0=no, 1=yes) 0.238 0.426 0.249 0.432 
Aged 45-54 (0=no, 1=yes) 0.202 0.401 0.214 0.410 
Aged 55+ (0=no, 1=yes) 0.168 0.374 0.178 0.383 
Married/Co-habiting (0=no, 1=yes) 0.704 0.456 0.726 0.446 
Household Size (1-10) 3.032 1.348 2.995 1.328 
Degree (First or Higher) (0=no, 1=yes) 0.140 0.347 0.146 0.354 
Teaching or Nursing (0=no, 1=yes)  0.271 0.444 0.288 0.453 
A Levels (0=no, 1=yes) 0.149 0.356 0.139 0.346 
GCSE (0=no, 1=yes) 0.174 0.379 0.168 0.374 
Immigrant (0=no, 1=yes) 0.008 0.091 – – 
Language Problem (0=no, 1=yes) 0.009 0.092 – – 
Health Problem – Arms, Legs, Hands etc. (0=no, 1=yes) 0.208 0.406 – – 
Health Problem – Sight (0=no, 1=yes) 0.032 0.177 – – 
Health Problem – Hearing (0=no, (1=yes) 0.065 0.246 – – 
Health Problem – Skin Condition/Allergy (0=no, 1=yes) 0.095 0.294 – – 
Health Problem – Chest/Breathing (0=no, 1=yes) 0.110 0.313 – – 
Health Problem – Heart/Blood Pressure (0=no, 1=yes) 0.098 0.297 – – 
Health Problem – Stomach or Digestion (0=no, 1=yes) 0.058 0.234 – – 
Health Problem – Diabetes (0=no, 1=yes) 0.022 0.146 – – 
Health Problem – Anxiety, Depression etc. (0=no, 1=yes) 0.050 0.217 – – 
Health Problem – Alcohol or Drugs (0=no, 1=yes) 0.008 0.087 – – 
Health Problem – Epilepsy (0=no, 1=yes) 0.008 0.089 – – 
Health Problem – Migraine (0=no, 1=yes) 0.047 0.211 – – 
Health Limits Daily Activity (0=no, 1=yes) 0.104 0.305 – – 
Log Household Labour Income (excluding own wage if not unemployed) 8.699 3.048 – – 
Partner Cares for Dependent Children (0=no, 1=yes) – – 0.147 0.354 
Index Number of Hours Caring for Others [0=none, 6=100 hrs+ per week)  – – 0.169 0.781 
Number of Children Aged ≤5 (0-3) – – 0.170 0.781 
Number of Children Aged ≥6 & ≤16 (0-4) – – 0.166 0.441 
Fair Health Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] – – 0.096 0.295 
Very Good/Good Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] – – 0.824 0.380 
Excellent Health Over Past 12 months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] – – 0.030 0.170 
OBSERVATIONS 58,149 48,227 
 
Table 1B: Summary Statistics 
 RESERVATION 
WAGE; d=1 
WAGE; d=0 
 MEAN STD MEAN STD 
Log Reservation Wage 5.088 0.452 – – 
Log Wage – – 5.371 0.562
White 0.605 0.489 0.678 0.467
Aged 25-34 (0=no, 1=yes) 0.270 0.444 0.268 0.443
Aged 35-44 (0=no, 1=yes) 0.203 0.402 0.283 0.450
Aged 45-54 (0=no, 1=yes) 0.156 0.363 0.224 0.417
Aged 55+ (0=no, 1=yes) 0.113 0.316 0.119 0.323
Number Employed in Household (0 to 5) 0.704 0.917 1.965 0.832
Number of Children (0 to 7) 0.803 1.172 0.714 1.009
Married/Co-habiting (0=no, 1=yes) 0.540 0.499 0.758 0.428
Degree (First or Higher) (0=no, 1=yes) 0.096 0.295 0.163 0.369
Teaching or Nursing (0=no, 1=yes)  0.184 0.388 0.311 0.463
A Levels (0=no, 1=yes) 0.103 0.304 0.133 0.340
GCSE (0=no, 1=yes) 0.183 0.387 0.177 0.381
Log Household Labour Income  6.111 3.048 9.632 1.274
Log Household Asset Income 1.985 2.808 3.673 2.963
Log Household Benefit Income 7.187 2.679 4.048 3.576
Log Wage in Previous Employment 3.067 3.340 1.636 2.953
Log Household Monthly Mortgage/Rent Costs 4.208 2.013 4.427 2.114
Years of Current Labour Market Status# 2.836 7.139 7.764 11.330
Years of Current Labour Market Status Squared 58.989 288.201 188.630 431.636
Fair Health Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] 0.137 0.344 0.068 0.251
Very Good/Good Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] 0.812 0.391 0.888 0.316
Excellent Health Over Past 12 months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] 0.008 0.090 0.034 0.181
OBSERVATIONS 2,216 37,224 
     Note: # i.e. self employed; employed; or unemployment 
 
 
Table 2: Health Stock Equation 
 VERY POOR OR 
POOR  HEALTH FAIR HEALTH 
VERY GOOD OR 
GOOD HEALTH 
EXCELLENT 
HEALTH 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = iH  M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E.  TSTAT
Aged 25-34 -0.0012 (0.40) -0.0137 (1.63) -0.0036 (0.38) 0.0185 (2.11) 
Aged 35-44 -0.0069 (2.38) -0.0199 (2.16) 0.0161 (1.54) 0.0106 (1.07) 
Aged 45-54 -0.0044 (1.43) -0.0331 (3.47) 0.0109 (0.96) 0.0267 (2.40) 
Aged 55+ -0.0217 (9.50) -0.0645 (6.46) 0.0405 (3.14) 0.0458 (3.44) 
Married/Co-habiting -0.0004 (0.15) -0.0020 (0.28) -0.0027 (0.34) 0.0051 (0.68) 
Household Size 0.0002 (0.27) -0.0002 (0.11) 0.0024 (0.98) -0.0023 (1.03) 
Degree (First or Higher) -0.0126 (5.02) -0.0888 (10.43) 0.0238 (2.13) 0.0776 (6.30) 
Teaching or Nursing  -0.0031 (1.26) -0.0625 (8.24) 0.0244 (2.67) 0.0411 (4.44) 
A Levels -0.0049 (1.71) -0.0547 (6.38) 0.0284 (2.70) 0.0312 (2.81) 
GCSE -0.0046 (1.70) -0.0374 (4.53) 0.0297 (3.02) 0.0123 (1.23) 
Labour Market Participant i.e. Employee, Self Employed or Unemployed -0.0029 (7.69) -0.0248 (2.97) 0.0442 (4.63) 0.0094 (1.12) 
Log Household Labour Income  -0.0005 (1.86) -0.0045 (4.85) 0.0018 (1.64) 0.0031 (3.07) 
Immigrant 0.0076 (0.96) -0.0536 (2.87) -0.0162 (0.67) 0.0622 (2.87) 
Language Problem 0.0170 (1.70) 0.0641 (2.40) -0.0123 (0.43) -0.0688 (2.97) 
Health Problem – Arms, Legs, Hands etc. (0=no, 1=yes) 0.0337 (11.00) 0.1265 (17.27) -0.0266 (3.45) -0.1336 (23.83) 
Health Problem – Sight (0=no, 1=yes) 0.0146 (2.97) 0.0492 (3.31) -0.0192 (1.24) -0.0446 (3.44) 
Health Problem – Hearing (0=no, (1=yes) 0.0037 (1.05) 0.0727 (6.02) -0.0158 (1.19) -0.0606 (5.53) 
Health Problem – Skin Condition/Allergy (0=no, 1=yes) -0.0003 (0.13) 0.0272 (3.07) 0.0093 (0.96) -0.0362 (4.05) 
Health Problem – Chest/Breathing (0=no, 1=yes) 0.0413 (10.07) 0.1478 (14.58) -0.0570 (5.52) -0.1321 (17.75) 
Health Problem – Heart/Blood Pressure (0=no, 1=yes) 0.0383 (8.13) 0.1676 (14.64) -0.0532 (4.60) -0.1528 (19.65) 
Health Problem – Stomach or Digestion (0=no, 1=yes) 0.0693 (10.69) 0.1965 (15.09) -0.0929 (6.83) -0.1729 (24.02) 
Health Problem – Diabetes (0=no, 1=yes) 0.0468 (4.44) 0.1655 (7.12) -0.0709 (2.82) -0.1414 (8.89) 
Health Problem – Anxiety, Depression etc. (0=no, 1=yes) 0.0685 (9.52) 0.2285 (15.53) -0.1349 (9.11) -0.1620 (20.06) 
Health Problem – Alcohol or Drugs (0=no, 1=yes) 0.0417 (3.25) 0.1781 (5.32) -0.1120 (3.04) -0.1078 (4.38) 
Health Problem – Epilepsy (0=no, 1=yes) 0.0140 (1.33) 0.1071 (2.58) -0.0333 (0.78) -0.0879 (3.35) 
Health Problem – Migraine (0=no, 1=yes) 0.0223 (4.12) 0.0867 (6.47) -0.0243 (1.67) -0.0846 (7.76) 
Health Limits Daily Activity 0.1812 (20.93) 0.1997 (14.55) -0.2213 (20.69) -0.1897 (31.28) 
CONTROLS Year Dummy Variables 
Wald Test ( )2 114χ  8,528.98   p=[0.000] 
Pseudo R Squared 0.1568 
OBSERVATIONS 58,149 
 
Table 3: Labour Market Participation 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE =  iPART
PANEL A: HEALTH STOCK M.E. T STAT 
Intercept -1.1042 (11.43) 
Aged 25-34 0.0878 (16.13) 
Aged 35-44 0.0868 (14.41) 
Aged 45-54 0.0532 (8.44) 
Aged 55+ -0.1534 (14.45) 
Married/Co-habiting 0.0631 (10.03) 
White 0.0164 (2.82) 
Degree (First or Higher) -0.0075 (0.85) 
Teaching or Nursing  0.0067 (1.05) 
A Levels -0.0719 (8.46) 
GCSE 0.0157 (2.11) 
Partner Cares for Dependent Children 0.0532 (7.72) 
Index Number of Hours Caring for Others -0.0235 (9.28) 
Number of Children Aged ≤5 -0.0087 (1.78) 
Number of Children Aged ≥6 & ≤16 -0.0134 (3.93) 
Household Size  0.0043 (2.00) 
Fair Health Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] 0.0957 (23.50) 
Very Good/Good Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] 0.6067 (38.77) 
Excellent Health Over Past 12 months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] 0.0907 (23.96) 
CONTROLS Year and Region 
Wald Test  ( )2 dχ 3,825.04  p=[0.000] 
PANEL B HEALTH EXOGENOUS M.E. T STAT 
Fair Health Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] 0.1073 (21.89)
Very Good/Good Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] 0.2181 (30.03)
Excellent Health Over Past 12 months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] 0.1626 (29.54)
OBSERVATIONS 48,227 
Note: M.E. denotes marginal effect. 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = Wage ln  Reservation 2w 1ln wWage  
PANEL A: HEALTH STOCK, NO SELECTION COEF T STAT COEF T STAT 
Intercept 3.8416 (8.11) 5.0666 (7.55) 
Aged 25-34 0.1616 (16.61) 0.1743 (6.86) 
Aged 35-44 0.2372 (23.12) 0.2785 (9.86) 
Aged 45-54 0.2322 (21.69) 0.2547 (8.34) 
Aged 55+ 0.1008 (7.98) 0.1586 (4.41) 
Married/Co-habiting 0.0826 (12.14) 0.0867 (3.96) 
White 0.0193 (3.57) -0.0262 (1.35) 
Degree (First or Higher) 0.2341 (24.67) 0.2102 (5.52) 
Teaching or Nursing  0.1124 (15.78) 0.1166 (4.65) 
A Levels 0.0554 (6.40) 0.1108 (3.57) 
GCSE 0.0391 (5.02) 0.0615 (2.49) 
Number Employed in Household -0.0614 (19.06) 0.0121 (0.98) 
Number of Children 0.0352 (10.63) 0.0115 (1.23) 
Log Household Labour Income  0.1040 (9.95) -0.0143 (4.29) 
Log Household Asset Income 0.0151 (16.84) -0.0034 (0.95) 
Log Household Benefit Income -0.0045 (5.32) -0.0065 (1.78) 
Log Wage in Previous Employment 0.0112 (11.80) 0.0206 (5.50) 
Log Household Monthly Mortgage/Rent Costs 0.0213 (17.08) 0.0249 (5.61) 
Years of Current Economic Status 0.0064 (7.53) -0.0020 (0.45) 
Years of Current Economic Status squared -0.0001 (3.75) -0.0001 (0.87) 
Regional Unemployment Rate -0.0142 (12.50) -0.0418 (9.94) 
Fair Health Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] 0.0982 (3.91) 0.0151 (0.32) 
Very Good/Good Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] 0.1291 (5.47) 0.0403 (0.93) 
Excellent Health Over Past 12 months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] 0.2254 (8.22) 0.1084 (1.02) 
Adjusted R Squared 0.3321 0.2244 
 Wage l  Reservation 2n w 1ln wWage  
PANEL B HEALTH EXOGENOUS, NO SELECTION COEF T STAT COEF T STAT 
Fair Health Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] 0.0693 (4.83) -0.0025 (0.07) 
Very Good/Good Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] 0.0867 (6.34) 0.0141 (0.40) 
Excellent Health Over Past 12 months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] 0.1176 (8.43) 0.0430 (1.15) 
Adjusted R Squared 0.3323 0.2250 
 Wage l  Reservation 2n w 1ln wWage  
PANEL C  HEALTH STOCK, SELECTION COEF T STAT COEF T STAT 
Fair Health Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] -0.0222 (0.63) -0.0174 (0.23) 
Very Good/Good Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] -0.0360 (0.87) -0.0055 (0.06) 
Excellent Health Over Past 12 months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] 0.0668 (2.56) 0.0627 (0.46) 
Adjusted R Squared 0.3325 0.2242 
 Wage l  Reservation 2n w 1ln wWage  
PANEL D HEALTH EXOGENOUS, SELECTION COEF T STAT COEF T STAT 
Fair Health Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] -0.0171 (0.86) -0.0166 (0.31) 
Very Good/Good Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] -0.0222 (1.00) -0.0041 (0.07) 
Excellent Health Over Past 12 months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] 0.0057 (0.25) 0.0242 (0.38) 
Adjusted R Squared 0.3330 0.2246 
OBSERVATIONS 37,224 2,216 
Note:  Additional controls in each panel are firm size; occupation; industry [current job if d=0, last/previous job if d=1] 
Table 4: OLS Wage and Reservation Wage Equations
 
Table 5: Endogenous Switching Model of Reservation Wages (With Clustering)  – No Control for Selection 
d  DEPENDENT VARIABLE = SWITCHING:  Wage 2ln w  Reservation Wage   1ln w
PANEL A: HEALTH STOCK M.E. T STAT COEF T STAT COEF T STAT 
Intercept 3.3265 (11.73) 3.8107 (5.70) 5.0803 (63.60) 
Aged 25-34 -0.0054 (10.16) 0.1650 (14.58) 0.1475 (5.43) 
Aged 35-44 -0.0059 (9.82) 0.2411 (18.58) 0.2480 (7.54) 
Aged 45-54 -0.0033 (4.80) 0.2348 (16.19) 0.2389 (5.77) 
Aged 55+ (4.81) 0.1035 (5.27) 0.1421 (3.04) 
Married/Co-habiting 
-0.0039
-0.0019 (3.99) 0.0831 (7.74) 0.0747 (2.65) 
White -0.0017 (3.68) 0.0198 (2.30) -0.0309 (1.43) 
Degree (First or Higher) -0.0028 (4.10) 0.2364 (13.33) 0.1953 (4.07) 
Teaching or Nursing  -0.0039 (7.01) 0.1144 (9.27) 0.0970 (2.93) 
A Levels -0.0025 (3.76) 0.0574 (3.85) 0.1007 (3.05) 
GCSE -0.0020 (3.48) 0.0409 (3.03) 0.0552 (2.08) 
Number Employed in Household -0.0066 (14.50) -0.0587 (11.82) -0.0325 (1.42) 
Number of Children -0.0015 (6.80) 0.0365 (7.11) 0.0046 (0.41) 
Log Household Labour Income  -0.0010 (14.19) 0.1050 (21.29) -0.0181 (3.77) 
Log Household Asset Income -0.0002 (2.50) 0.0152 (11.03) -0.0044 (1.01) 
Log Household Benefit Income 0.0011 (17.11) -0.0052 (4.40) 0.0009 (0.36) 
Log Wage in Previous Employment 0.0006 (10.97) 0.0109 (10.26) 0.0237 (4.81) 
Log Household Monthly Mortgage/Rent Costs 0.0000 (0.08) 0.0214 (9.35) 0.0247 (4.16) 
Years of Current Economic Status -0.0007 (9.21) 0.0066 (5.18) -0.0057 (0.82) 
Years of Current Economic Status squared 0.0000 (8.02) -0.0001 (2.57) -0.0001 (0.15) 
Regional Unemployment Rate -0.0003 (1.17) -0.0147 (8.95) -0.0369 (7.01) 
Fair Health Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] -0.0002 (2.07) 0.0980 (2.69) 0.0067 (0.14) 
Very Good/Good Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] -0.0044 (4.03) 0.1300 (3.61) 0.0209 (0.46) 
Excellent Health Over Past 12 months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] -0.0080 (4.53) 0.2268 (5.70) 0.0636 (0.62) 
CONTROLS Firm size; occupation; industry [current job if d=0, last/previous job if d=1] 
Wald Test ( )2 zχ  504.47, p=[0.000]   
PANEL B HEALTH EXOGENOUS M.E. T STAT COEF T STAT COEF T STAT 
Fair Health Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] -0.0017 (2.25) 0.0720 (3.42) -0.0072 (0.17) 
Very Good/Good Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] -0.0032 (4.28) 0.0904 (4.29) 0.0010 (0.02) 
Excellent Health Over Past 12 months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] -0.0041 (5.16) 0.1216 (5.63) 0.0249 (0.58) 
OBSERVATIONS 39,440 
Note: M.E. denotes marginal effect. 
 
 
Table 6: Endogenous Switching Model of Reservation Wages (With Clustering)  – Controlling for Selection 
d  DEPENDENT VARIABLE = SWITCHING:  Wage 2ln w  Reservation Wage   1ln w
PANEL A: HEALTH STOCK M.E. T STAT COEF T STAT COEF T STAT 
Intercept 2.5857 (6.42) 4.0220 (42.34) 5.1202 (29.42) 
Aged 25-34 -0.0044 (6.88) 0.1339 (9.04) 0.1399 (3.77) 
Aged 35-44 -0.0049 (7.02) 0.2116 (13.46) 0.2406 (5.74) 
Aged 45-54 -0.0027 (3.77) 0.2154 (13.69) 0.2349 (5.32) 
Aged 55+ -0.0056 (5.55) 0.1523 (6.37) 0.1523 (2.54) 
Married/Co-habiting -0.0013 (2.44) -0.0667 (5.75) 0.0712 (2.49) 
White -0.0016 (3.37) 0.0147 (1.67) -0.0323 (1.43) 
Degree (First or Higher) -0.0028 (4.21) 0.2382 (13.44) 0.1946 (4.05) 
Teaching or Nursing  -0.0039 (6.91) 0.1128 (9.13) 0.0963 (2.90) 
A Levels -0.0031 (4.60) 0.0737 (4.73) 0.1050 (2.93) 
GCSE -0.0019 (3.23) 0.0369 (2.71) 0.0538 (2.01) 
Number Employed in Household -0.0066 (14.46) -0.0591 (11.90) -0.0339 (1.45) 
Number of Children -0.0015 (7.07) 0.0372 (7.27) 0.0048 (0.42) 
Log Household Labour Income  -0.0010 (14.18) 0.1050 (21.32) -0.0181 (3.77) 
Log Household Asset Income -0.0002 (2.49) 0.0151 (10.95) -0.0043 (1.01) 
Log Household Benefit Income 0.0011 (17.02) -0.0050 (4.30) 0.0012 (0.20) 
Log Wage in Previous Employment 0.0006 (10.91) 0.0108 (10.23) 0.0239 (4.83) 
Log Household Monthly Mortgage/Rent Costs 0.0000 (0.18) 0.0214 (9.36) 0.0246 (4.15) 
Years of Current Economic Status -0.0007 (9.28) 0.0066 (5.22) -0.0055 (0.82) 
Years of Current Economic Status squared 0.0000 (8.07) -0.0001 (2.63) 0.0001 (0.16) 
Regional Unemployment Rate -0.0003 (1.21) -0.0138 (8.31) -0.0365 (6.87) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.0050 (2.71) -0.1693 (3.27) -0.0301 (0.29) 
Fair Health Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] 0.0014 (0.80) -0.0224 (0.41) -0.0163 (0.16) 
Very Good/Good Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] 0.0009 (0.39) -0.0351 (0.55) -0.0119 (0.10) 
Excellent Health Over Past 12 months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] -0.0027 (2.03) 0.0582 (0.89) 0.0307 (0.20) 
CONTROLS Firm size; occupation; industry [current job if d=0, last/previous job if d=1] 
Wald Test ( )2 zχ  508.22, p=[0.000]   
PANEL B HEALTH EXOGENOUS M.E. T STAT COEF T STAT COEF T STAT 
Fair Health Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] -0.0001 (0.10) -0.0149 (0.52) -0.0185 (0.26) 
Very Good/Good Over Past 12 Months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] -0.0013 (0.97) -0.0193 (0.60) -0.0138 (0.17) 
Excellent Health Over Past 12 months (0=no, 1=yes) [t-1] -0.0021 (2.62) 0.0089 (0.27) 0.0094 (0.11) 
OBSERVATIONS 39,440 
Note: M.E. denotes marginal effect. 
